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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. MULLINS, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
RALPH M. EVANS and ROYAL 
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION; INC., 
a California corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14407 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING 
Respondent seeks relief from the Courtfs opinion reversing 
the juryfs findings and verdict of liability entered herein. It 
appears to the respondent that the Court has either overlooked 
some of the evidence adduced at the trial or has misconstrued 
some of the facts in the case, thereby resolving the issues of 
fact in favor of appellants and against respondent contrary to 
the jury's findings. It is respectfully submitted that the long-
standing rule of law of this Court is to the effect that the 
prevailing party at the trial level is entitled to a construction 
of the facts most favorable to the jury's findings, together 
with all inferences flowing therefrom. Respondent respectfully 
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submits that the Court has failed to follow this rule in its 
opinion heretofore rendered in the respects as will be set forth 
in this Petition. 
A literal reading of the Courtfs opinion leads one to 
believe that the law in this State now deprives a corporate 
creditor of any standing to enforce his claim against a purchaser 
of the debtor corporation unless he can show that the purchasing 
corporation knew of the outstanding obligation. On page 3 of 
the Courtfs opinion, the last paragraph thereof, this Court stated 
unequivocally that the plaintiff and respondent herein was in no < 
better standing with his claim than someone with an unrecorded 
mortgage on a piece of machinery which had been sold for value. 
Respondent fails to correlate the Courtfs analogy of respondent's 
claim as it may be related to a chattel mortgagee The statutes 
of the State of Utah clearly provide methods by which a person < 
may record a chattel mortgage to preserve his rights. There is 
no method by virtue of statute known to respondent to preserve 
a claim for commissions as set forth in plaintifffs complaint. 
There simply appears to be no recording protection available to 
the plaintiff herein. • 
The Court also states in the next to last paragraph on 
page 3 of its opinion that there might be or would be a contingent 
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liability on the part of defendant, Royal Industries1 purchase 
of the Evans Corporation if it could be shown that 
f!Royal Industries knew or had any reason to know 
that Mro Mullins would claim a commission on 
machines which it would manufacture and sell.11 
The testimony taken at the time of trial and which will 
be set forth verbatim shows that there was ample; reason and oppor-
tunity for the purchasing corporation, Royal, to know or acquaint 
itself with the obligations of the selling corporation. If the 
Court, in its opinion, is saying that a purchaser of a corporation, 
assets and obligations, may overlook, through its own negligence 
or otherwise, an obligation and thereby avoid the same, it would 
then place the creditors of the selling corporation in an impossi-
ble situation. How simple it would be for the seller and purchaser 
to both state at the time of trial that neither had discussed the 
obligation or considered the same in the transaction, thereby avoid-
ing responsibility and defeating a creditor!s claim0 It is 
respectfully submitted that the substance of the transaction should 
be considered, together with the testimony, and not merely the form 
of the writingo The test should be whether or not the purchasing 
corporation had a reasonable opportunity to acquaint itself with 
the obligations of the seller and whether or not, through its own 
inadvertence or neglect, it failed to do so. To reason otherwise 
would promote dishonesty between buyer and seller to the detriment 
of creditors. The record clearly shows by the testimony of defend-
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ant, Ralph Evans, that the records of Mullins1 claim were avail 
able and very possibly could have been reviewed by the purchase 
accountants and attorneys0 He testified as follows: 
f,Q0 And the fact of the matter is the minute you 
sent Mr0 Mullins that notice that you weren't 
going to give him any more money and gave him 
a check to settle up what you thought you were 
going to give him any more money and gave him 
a check to settle up what you thought you were 
going to be able to terminate the agreement, 
he immediately wrote back with a letter within 
a matter of a couple of weeks, didnft he; told 
you he wasn't the least bit satisfied and told 
you he wasn't going to sit still for it? 
"A. He did not say he wouldn't accept it. Accepted 
the check and cashed the check. 
"Q. Of course, because you owed him the money. He 
also wrote you and told you that he wasn't sat-
isfied and that he considered it an agreement 
and he didn't think you were the kind that you 
weren't going to live up to your word, didn't 
he, in his letter? 
ffA. He wrote down that he wasn't satisfied but he 
accepted the check and he cashed the check and 
in the letter, in my letter I stated to him 
that this was payment in full for all his ser-
vices rendered to R. M. Evans Company and 
Evans Manufacturing Companyc 
,fQ. And you said it was your word that was at stake 
in his letter? 
"A. Pardon? 
ffQ. He said it was your word that was at stake, that 
you made the agreement and it was your word that 
was at stake, didn't he?11 (Testimony of Ralph 
Evans, TR 949 to 950.) 
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Evans further testified that when the representatives of 
Royal came to his company to go over their records to formulate 
their merger agreement, Evans made all records available for 
their examination. He stated: 
flQ. When Evans, when the Royal people came over, 
was it your understanding that they knew or 
had access, had access to the data about 
Mr0 Mullins and the agreement? 
flA0 Yes, sir, they had access to it. Yes, sir." 
(R 964.) (Emphasis suppliedo) 
He further testified: 
MQ. Where was that information and that material 
pertaining to Mr. Mullins; was it in your 
files downstairs? 
,fA. We had a set of files, had a file cabinet, 
files and they1re all marked by the differ-
ent companies we deal with, and everybody 
had total access to them, and when they made 
the survey and things, while the accountants 
were there, why they went through all the 
fileSo" (R 971o) (Emphasis supplied0) 
Evans admitted in his testimony that within about two weeks 
after he wrote his letter to Mullins, terminating, or at least 
attempting to terminate his agreement to pay commissions, that 
Mullins immediately responded within two weeks with a letter 
setting forth that he did not agree to the unilateral cancelation 
of their written agreement. The jury also so found the facts to 
be as claimed by Mullins, namely, that he was not accepting the 
check from Evans as a complete satisfaction of all obligations 
owed to him under the agreemento Nevertheless, the Court, in its 
opinion, sets forth that Evans testified to the effect that he Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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thought there was nothing further to be done since, in his opin-
ion, he thought that Mullins had accepted his check and there 
was no further claim that would be made by Mullins. This is 
simply contrary to the evidence and the juryfs findings. See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which is Mullins1 letter sent to Evans 
within two weeks after his attempted cancelation of the agree-
ment setting forth that he was not accepting the unilateral 
cancelation. How on earth the Court could feel that Evans 
had any justifiable reason to consider the agreement with Mullins 
as canceled is not justified by the evidence and the jury's find-
ings. Evans acknowledged receiving Mullins1 letter but 
apparently chose to ignore Mullins1 claim because of his sale to 
Royal. In any event, the jury specifically found that Mullins 
did not agree to the unilateral termination of the commission 
agreement. 
The Court's opinion apparently chose to disregard the jury 
findings in favor of respondent and has selected a self-serving 
statement of defendant, Evans, to the effect that he had decided 
that Mullins had no further claim. The uncontroverted evidence 
further shows by testimony of Evans as follows: 
MQ. When you sold the corporate assets of the 
R. M. Evans Company to the Royal Industries, 
did you discuss with anybody from Royal 
Industries that you had written documents 
or letters to Mr. Mullins giving him some 
sort of an interest in the commissions or 
profits of your company? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lfA# It was never specifically discussed, I don't 
think. They had access to all records from 
the time the company was formed and they had 
their own accountants, plus Price & Waterhouse, 
who reviewed all the legal documents and 
accounting records from inception0 
nQ. Do you know whether or not Royal Industries 
were aware of or saw your letter to Mr. Mullins 
of August 23rd, 1968, wherein you indicate his 
share of the 52 EZY-Bond Pinch Roller Machines 
that were sold at $1,211.60 and indicating that 
his XL commission on the net profit -of the R. M. 
Evans Manufacturing Company to March 31, 1967 
indicated $389.80--do you know whether or not 
this correspondence or copies of it were avail-
able to the Royal Industries when they purchased 
all of the assets of your company? 
,fA. It was available to them, yes0ff (R 761 and 762.) 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
It should also be kept in mind that at the time of trial, 
Evans testified on behalf of all defendants* The record does 
not indicate in any respect that his testimony was to be binding 
only upon himself. 
He further testified: 
"Q. What investigations to your knowledge were 
made by Royal Industries as to the financial 
condition of the two corporations? 
ffAo There was a couple of the top executives of 
Royal Industries, and examined the records0 
"Q* Who would that be? 
f,Ae Mr. Johnson and Mr. Freedman0 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,fQ. What is their position? 
"A. Mrc Johnson is the President of Royal 
Industries and Mrc Freedman is Vice 
President in Charge of Finance, 
"Qo 0kayo And what occurred? 
,fAo And they come in and reviewed the records, " 
the premises, the operation, and then in 
turn we arrived at an agreement in principle 
and they called in Price, Waterhouse, who is 
the national CPA firm which does all of the 
auditing for Royal Industries, and they come 
in and took a certified audit of the opera-
tions o 
,fQ. Did the Royal Industries people examine the 
books of the two companies? 
ffA0 Yes, sir, they dido 
MQ. Did they discuss the books and financial 
affairs of the two companies with the 
accountant for the two companies? 
"A. Yes, sir, they did." (R 899 and 900.) 
The record is amply clear that commissions were being paid 
to Mullins and that there was correspondence in the company records 
and files, together with obvious records indicating that Mullins 
was receiving a commission on all machines being soldo These 
records were undeniably available to be seen and examined had 
they been properly reviewed. Apparently, no one from Royal asked 
Evans for additional information concerning the Mullins agreement 
and evidently, from the lack of evidence in the record, no one 
from Royal has ever claimed that the records were concealed. The 
record is totally silent on any such claim. The only logical 
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conclusion which may be drawn from the evidence is that the 
records were there to be seenc In regard to the review of the 
records by the accountants and officers of Royal, Mrc Freedman, 
as Vice President of Royal Industries, testified he was a 
Certified Public Accountant and that he, among others, had re-
viewed the Evans Company records before entering into the 
agreement to purchase both companies. He admitted that the 
negotiations involved the liabilities of the Evans Companies as 
well as the assets and that these were considered in the purchase 
price. (R 909.) 
MrG Freedman testified as follows: 
ffQo And you, also as far as you knew and what 
Mr. Evans revealed to you through these 
companies, you, were buying all the obliga-
tions and seeing that they were taken care 
of, too, whatever was disclosed? 
!fA0 We had no reason, yes, we had no reason to 
believe that all of the obligations that the 
company had were not disclosed to us, and 
those were the obligations that we were 
assuming. 
f,Q0 So as far as Royal was concerned you thought 
you were being fully informed of all assets 
and obligations and that you were buying all 
of those? 
,fA0 That is rightoff (R 909o) 
It is clear from the testimony of Mrc Freedman that Royal 
Industries intended to accept and thought they were getting all 
of the liabilities of the Evans Companies except those enumerated 
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specifically in the agreement as being reservedo He also indicated 
in his testimony that they thought they were getting all of the 
obligations as disclosed by the company records. Whether or not 
the accountants reviewed the records properly is not an issue in 
this case. The Court has clearly pointed out in its main opinion 
that if there was reason for Royal to have knowledge of the obliga-
tion, there might be liability. Certainly, from the records, 
there is reason to know of the claim of Mullins if the records 
had been reviewed as the parties claim they did. 
Freedman clearly testified that his company, Royal Industries, 
thought they were getting all of the liabilities other than those 
set forth in Exhibit D-45, the merger agreement*, In fact, he testi-
fied that certain funds were being withheld in escrow to cover a 
contingency that they had overlooked some of the debts or obliga-
tions of Evans Companies. In referring to the agreement between 
Evans Companies and Royal, Mr. Freedman was asked: 
f,Q0 To your knowledge, Mr. Freedman, is there any-
thing in the document that requires MrD Evans 
to reimburse your company, the Royal Industries, 
for any undisclosed liabilities that you have 
to become liable for in this action? 
ffA0 I believe that there was a period of time after 
the agreement was executed, a part of the con-
sideration that we paid to him was set aside in 
an escrow for any, I think it was two years, if 
I am not mistaken, for any liabilities that we 
would have become responsible for that were un-
known at the time the deal was made0" (R 925 
to 9260) (Emphasis supplied.) 
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This law suit in question was filed within that two-year 
period as is evidenced by the complaint on file he ^  inc 
The record again clearly shows that Royal Industries in-
tended to take all of the obligations except those enumerated in 
the agreement as being specifically withheld or exempt from the 
agreemento There were even provisions for escrow of funds to 
cover any obligations which might have been overlooked*, 
If a generous approach to the facts is taken and it is 
merely alleged that the parties to the agreement, namely, the 
defendants herein, had overlooked the Mullins obligation, it 
would still have been an obligation of the Royal Industries as 
contemplated by its purchase agreement with the Evans Companies0 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence simply does 
not support the Courtfs findings that there was no proof that 
Royal Industries 
"knew or had any reason to know" 
that Mullins would claim a commission on his machines. Mullins1 
immediate reply to Evans denouncing his attempt to cancel the 
agreement, as is evidenced by his letter heretofore designated 
"as Exhibit P-6, which clearly shows the same0 The jury also made 
such a finding of facto A review of the records and any reason-
able inquiry which might have been made by Royal, had it contacted 
Mr« Mullins, would have obviously revealed his claim0 Since no 
one claims that the information concerning the contract with 
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Mullins was withheld from Royal, it can only logically be inferred 
that they saw the agreement and failed to heed its meaning or 
through their own inadvertence, overlooked the sameQ In either 
instance, they should not be relieved of responsibility0 It is 
clear that their own agreement intended to make provision for 
any eventuality, such as an overlooked debt which might arise0 
In any event, Royal's failure to make provisions for the Mullins 
claim was brought about by their fault, not Mullins0 
This Courtfs opinion, on page 3, paragraph 4 thereof, 
further states as follows: 
ffAs a part of the sale, the purchaser agreed to 
assume all debts and liabilities of the selling 
corporation.fl 
The fact that MrG Freedman of Royal disclaimed any personal 
knowledge of the obligation certainly does not negate the evidence 
that the information was there to be seen. It also does not 
nullify the terms of the agreement wherein special escrow provi-
sions were made to cover such eventualities as an overlooked 
obligation. The records were certainly there to be seen as is 
shown by the uncontradicted evidence. 
This Court then states in its opinion at the conclusion 
of the same as follows: 
ffIf anybody owed any obligation to Mr0 Mullins, 
it was the R, Mc Evans Company, IncG but that 
company was not made a party to this action,,11 
19 
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It is respectfully pointed out that at the time of the 
bringing of this suit, there was no company in existence named 
R. M. Evans Company, Inc. who could respond in damages in any 
event. The facts and evidence clearly show that the only thing 
remaining of the Evans Corporations at the conclusion of their 
agreement with Royal were the corporate books. All of the 
corporate stock of the Royal Corporation given*to the Evans 
Companies as payment for the purchase of the company was re-
quired to be immediately disbursed to the stockholders and a 
liquidation of the companies had to be brought about as soon as 
possiblec 
This Court also said in its opinion that in any event if 
the R. M. Evans Company did not make any further machines, the 
agreement with Evans would have been in essence worthless because 
he would have no commissions coming. In one breath, the opinion 
says we should have sued the Evans Company after the sale to 
Royal for commissions but then states that if Evans Company did 
not make any further machines, we have nothing coming. It would 
seem that what the Court's opinion is saying, in substance, is 
that either way Mr. Mullins was to turn, he is left without a 
remedyo In other words, the person or corporation having con-
tracted to pay the obligation could assign it to someone else 
and thereby both parties avoid any responsibility under the agree-
ment. This seems totally unsupported by logic or law. 
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As is indicated by the Court's own opinion, a law suit 
against Evans Companies after the acquisition of the companies 
by Royal would have produced, at best, a judgment with about as 
much value as a "Gerald Ford Button0,f 
The law should be and respondent believes still is to the 
effect that acquisition agreements as evidenced by the testimony 
I 
in this case and Exhibit D-45 should be reviewed as to their 
substance, not just merelyas to form. In reference to said 
Exhibit, it is captioned at the top of the first page 
"Closing Documents Royal Industries, Inc0 
Acquisition of R. Mc Evans & Company, Inc. 
and Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company, Inc0lf 
The plan of reorganization as the agreement is referred 
to on page 1 of the Exhibit clearly sets forth that the intent 
is to acquire all, or at least substantially all of the assets 
of the Evans Companies0 The agreement states on page 1 thereof 
,f
..«and the assumption by Royal of substantially 
all of the corporations1 liabilities0ff 
In paragraph 2 of page 13 of Exhibit D-45, it again 
clearly indicates that it was contemplated that the stock being 
given to Evans Companies by virtue of the acquisition was to be 
immediately distributed to the stockholders and a liquidation 
was to take place of the companies0 What difference in sub-
stance is there to such an agreement as compared to some of the 
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more formal requirements in mergers that the stocks be given 
directly to stockholders? A provision that the stock go to the 
corporation with a mandatory requirement of immediate distribu-
tion to stockholders accompanied by a liquidation of the 
corporation appears to accomplish exactly the same resulto The 
only distinguishing feature might be the tax consequences to the 
parties involved. This should not have a bearing on claims made 
by creditorso 
On page 29 of the Merger Agreement, Article IX, it is 
captioned as follows: 
"Liquidation of Corporation 9.1c The Corporation 
further agrees that promptly after the closing 
date, the Corporation shall file all necessary, 
documents for the Secretary of State of the 
State of Arizona to liquidate the Corporation, 
and to distribute to its shareholders all 
shares of the common stock of Royal received by 
Corporation and then available for distribution 
on a pro rata basis. The Corporation shall be 
obligated immediately to change the name of the 
Corporation to a name agreed to by Royal0n 
In the Merger Agreement, the Evans Companies were referred 
to as "Corporation," It is clear from the agreement that it was 
never intended that the stock traded by Royal for the assets of 
the Evans Companies would be held for the purposes of payment 
to creditors or for a further sale or investment by the Evans 
Companies to perpetuate those companies0 The agreement clearly 
shows that the contrary was required. The stock was to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
immediately given to the stockholders and the companies liqui-
datedo Under such a state of facts, it is difficult to under-
stand how such an arrangement can be anything but a merger 
agreement. Certainly, in substance, that is exactly what was 
brought about by the agreement,, 
In 19 AraJur 2d, page 923 (Corporations), Section 1546, 
it is stated: 
"There are certain instances, however, in which 
the purchaser or transferee may become liable 
for the obligations of the transferor corpora-
tionD The transferee may be held liable for 
the debts of the transferor corporation: (1) 
where there is an express or implied assumption 
of liability; o0.0n (Emphasis supplied0) 
Surely, the Agreement of Acquisition contemplates both an 
express and an implied assumption of all obligations other than 
those specifically excluded by the agreemento Provisions were 
made in the Agreement to accommodate claims that may have been 
overlooked as apparently was the Mullins claim0 
Mr0 Evans testified at the time of trial that his companies 
were, after the merger agreement, virtually non-existent companiesc 
(R 9640) He also testified that he was not allowed to use the 
corporate names in the future and that by virtue of the agreement 
with Royal, there was nothing left of his companies by a shello 
(R 966.) He was asked: 
• . • • ' . - . 
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,fQ0 Was there anything withheld by the Rc M0 
Evans Corporation other than the corporate 
name when it sold to Royal Industries? 
lfA0 Noo11 (R 711.) 
The merger agreement further contemplated an immediate 
dissolution of the Evans Companies as is evidenced by Article X 
on page 29 of Exhibit D-45, wherein it states: 
nAll covenants, agreements, representations 
and warranties made hereunder and in any certi-
ficate delivered at closing pursuant hereto 
shall be deemed to have been relied upon by 
Royal and by Corporation (Evans Companies) and 
shall survive the execution of this agreement, 
the closing, the liquidation or dissolution of 
Corporation, and any investigation that either 
party or any of its agents or employees may 
have made prior to the closingo11 (Emphasis 
suppliedo) 
The liquidation of a corporation is generally deemed in 
law to be the winding up of its affairs0 See 19 AmJur 2d, 
Corporations, Page 953, Section 15860 
It appears obvious from Exhibit D-45 that all parties to 
the acquisition considered that the Evans Companies were to be 
immediately liquidated or dissolvedo A case in point, which 
demonstrates the futility of reviewing the evidence as to form 
rather than substance, is Stanley Knapp, Jr. vs0 North American 
Rockwell Corporation, CCA 3rd (1974), 506 Fed, 2d 361* In the 
Knapp case, the facts of acquisition of the corporation by 
defendant, North American Rockwell, were very similar to those 
in the instant case. The agreement in many ways was almost 
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identical in terminologyo It was claimed by defendant, Rockwell, 
that because it was a purchase of certain liabilities as well as 
assets that any tort obligations not known at the time could not 
be imposed upon the successor corporation0 The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
"Denying Knapp the right to sue Rockwell because of 
the barren continuation of TMW after the exchange 
with Rockwell would allow a formality to defeat 
Knappfs recoveryc Although TMW technically 
existed as an independent corporation, it had no 
substanceD The parties clearly contemplated that 
TMW would terminate its existence as a part of the 
transactionQ TMW had, in exchange for Rockwell 
stock, disposed of all of the assets it originally 
held, exclusive of the cash necessary to consummate 
the transaction. It could not undertake any active 
operationso Nor was TMW permitted under the agree-
ment to divest itself of the Rockwell stock, so 
that it might become an effective investment vehicle 
for its shelters. Most significantly, TMW was 
required by the contract with Rockwell to dissolve 
fas soon as practicable.f 
ff0n the other hand, Rockwell acquired all the assets 
of TMW, exclusive of certain real estate that 
Rockwell did not want, and assumed practically all 
of TMWfs liabilitieso Further, Rockwell required 
that TMW use its fbest efforts,1 prior to the con-
summation of the transaction, to preserve TMWfs 
business organization intact for Rockwell, to make 
available to Rockwell TMWfs existing officers and 
employees, and to maintain TMWfs relationship with 
its customers and suppliers0 After the exchange, 
Rockwell continued TMW's former business operations. 
ffIf we are to follow the philosopy of the Pennsylvania 
courts that questions of an injured partyfs right 
to seek recovery are to be resolved by the analysis 
of public policy considerations rather than by a 
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mere procrustean application of formalities, we 
must, in considering whether the TMW-Rockwell 
exchange was a merger, evaluate the public policy 
implications of that determination0ff 
The main opinion of the Circuit Court then went on to hold 
that the substance of the agreement was in effect a merger and 
therefore, the plaintiff did have a standing in court to sueD 
The concurring opinion filed by one of the judges of the Circuit 
Court further sets forth the conclusions to be drawn from such 
facts as we have in our instant case as follows: 
ffI believe that, where a corporation purchases 
substantially all of the assets of a second 
corporation, the legislature intended to impose 
the second corporation's tort liabilities on 
the acquiring corporation at least if the 
following attributes of merger are present: 
(1) an ongoing business, including its name 
and good will, is transferred to the acquiring 
corporation; and (2) the corporation whose assets 
are acquired is dissolved after distribution to 
its shareholders of the consideration received 
from the acquiring corporation 
"In the present case, TMW transferred to Rockwell 
almost all of its assets, retaining only its 
corporate records and a limited amount of cash, 
to effectuate the transaction, 
,lfThe agreement and plan of reorganization1 specifi-
cally provided for the transfer of TMWfs business 
fas a going concern,1 including good will, exclu-
sive right to use the name ftextile machine works1 
and the fpermits or licenses to conduct business 
as now carried on.1 TMW also agreed to change its 
name and dissolvec In this regard, the agreement 
and plan of reorganization provided that fon the 
closing date, TMW shall take all action required 
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to change its name to TW Company
 0..0 as soon as 
practical after the last liquidating distributions 
to its shareholders of Rockwell stock, TMW shall 
wind up its affairs and dissolve... flf (Emphasis 
suppliedo) 
The Court further went on to state in the concurring opinion: 
"In addition, this transaction has another charac-
teristic of a statutory merger0 The consideration 
given for TMWfs assets was Rockwell stock which 
in turn was to be distributed to TMW shareholders 
on TMWfs liquidation and dissolution. Thus, TMW 
shareholders became shareholders fin Rockwell just 
as if they had exchanged their shares directly with 
Rockwell under the statutory merger procedure0f 
ff0n the basis of the foregoing, I am persuaded that 
the Pennsylvania courts would consider this trans-
action a merger within the intentment of section 
803o This I believe they would do even though the 
transaction was structured as a sale and even 
though TMW had not fully wound up its affairs and 
dissolved until eighteen months after the culmina-
tion. TMW actually had ceased to function as a 
going concern when the sale was consummated0 Only 
a corporate shell remained, engaged solely in the 
process of winding up and dissolution. 
"While I recognize the rightful prerogative of a 
corporation to rearrange its business or go out 
of business entirely, there is also a practical 
and reasonable basis for construing this transac-
tion as a mergence.ff 
The judge then concluded: 
,fI realize that the acquiring corporation was not a 
party to any tortious act and had no connection 
with the acquiring corporation at the time the 
alleged defective product was manufactured,,11 
The concurring opinion then agreed that the judgment in favor of 
( 
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the defendant should be reversed0 The fact that Mullins claim 
herein is based upon a contract right as opposed to a tort 
obligation would appear to have no basis for distinctionD 
CONCLUSION 
This Courtfs opinion in the instant case effectively 
points out by its reasoning the impossibility of enforcing the 
i 
Mullins agreement under any circumstances. The Court first says 
that any claim, if there be one against anyone, should have been 
against the Evans Companies but in the next breath, it says that 
if the Evans Companies do not make any additional machines, 
there is no claim0 This would make a suit against the Evans 
Companies worthless since they apparently made no more machines 
but sold all of the rights to Royal0 The Court then states 
that unless there is some sort of recording so that Royal would 
be aware of the Mullins1 interest in the machines, it would not 
be bound and he would be in the position of an unsecured 
creditor holding an imrecorded chattel mortgage. In the instant 
case, there is no way known to the undersigned by which Mullins 
could have recorded anything to protecthis rights0 He must 
rely upon the law and the facts to protect him0 If the Court 
is going to allow the defendants, by their evidence, to conclude 
that Mullins really was not serious in making a claim and 
therefore, deprive Mullins of his claim unilaterally, it then 
appears that the only possibility that Mullins had to protect his 
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right would have been to give actual notice to Royal0 The diffi-
culty with this position is obvious, however. Mullins had no 
knowledge of the corporate acquisition taking place until long 
after it had been concludedo At this point in time, if the 
Courtfs logic is followed, the door was closed on Mullins because 
an innocent purchaser for value could not be held liable0 
i i 
One might then ask, could not Mullins have pursued the 
assets by way of Royalfs stock which was given for the merger 
directly to the stockholders for his reliefo The difficulty with 
that argument would also be that as the Court pointed out in its 
opinion, since Evans Companies made no more machines, there 
would be nothing by way of damage and again Mullins1 suit would 
have been to no avail. 
If the Courtfs opinion is taken literally, namely, that 
Mullins could only claim the fruits of his contract as against 
machines made by the Evans Companies, then it appears obvious 
that the agreement could easily be circumvented by a transfer 
to a third partyc Such a conclusion would be tantamount to a 
breach of agreement without a remedy0 It would permit anyone 
to relieve himself of a contractual obligation merely by con-
veying the subject of the contract to third parties. Admittedly, 
however, if third parties were willing to concede they knew and 
had actual knowledge of such a transfer, they may be held liable, 
but who would be willing to admit such a fact if not forced to 
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do so. Proof of actual knowledge in many instances would be vir-
tually impossible. In spite of this, however, there still remains 
one other problem. There are no recording acts of any nature known 
to the undersigned whereby Mullins could have preserved any rights 
by giving constructive notice by recording. In other words, by 
virtue of the Courtfs opinion, he is left without a remedy under 
any view of the facts. 
With all due respect to the Courtfs opinion and this 
Honorable Court, it appears to the undersigned that a gross injus-
tice is being perpetrated upon the respondent herein. The opinion 
allows the Evans Companies to unilaterally claim they thought the 
agreement had been terminated by mutual consent when, in fact, 
the jury found to the contrary. The problem is further compounded 
by stating that although Royal received all of the benefits of the 
machine and Mullins1 efforts, it could still avoid any consequences 
of the agreement by merely stating it had no knowledge of the same, 
even though its own merger agreement, which it prepared, provides 
for compensation for claims which might have been overlooked. 
Whether or not Royal had actual knowledge of the agreement between 
Evans and Mullins is not really material0 The Court concedes that 
reason to know of this agreement was sufficient to impose liability. 
It is respectfully submitted that the records of the Evans Companies 
which were reviewed from the inception of the Companies to the date 
of the merger agreement, were clearly available for inspection and 
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should have imparted knowledge to anyone checking the records0 
It seems totally inequitable to allow Royal to escape responsi-
bility by having Evans testify that he personally thought the 
agreement had been terminated because of his own unilateral con-
tract, and contrary to the jury's findings0 The unilateral 
decision by Evans to breach his companies1 agreement with Mullins 
should not be permitted as a basis for the Courtfs decisionG No 
substantive distinction can be drawn between agreement of acqui-
sition as evidenced by Exhibit D-45 and a clear-cut statutory 
merger other than the tax resultsD Clearly, the form of the 
agreement between the parties herein amounted to a merger, at 
least a de facto merger. As was pointed out in Knapp, supra, 
where the ongoing business, including its name and good will, is 
transferred to the acquiring corporation; and to the corporation 
whose assets are acquired is dissolved after distribution to its 
shareholders of the consideration received from the acquiring 
corporation, this does in fact constitute a mergerG The Court's 
decision should be reconsidered and reversed, and the judgment 
and verdict of the trial court reinstated,, 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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